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School Prayer and the Establishment of
Religion: A Look at Engel v. Vitale
Christopher A. Bauer
Introduction
The Founders did not intend for religious practice
to be separate from education. While drafting the policy
that would govern the affairs of the University of Virginia
in 1824, Thomas Jefferson included this requirement: ''The
students of the University will be free, and expected to
attend religious worship at the establishment of their
respective sects, in the morning, and in time to meet their
school in the University at its stated hour" (Cord 135).
Today, there is a rising sentiment in the country to return
to such aspirations of the Founding Fathers. Julian R.
Kossow, in a recent law review article, sunu11arized this
growing consensus: ·'The religious right has repeatedly
expressed its desire to make America a 'Christian nation.'
A majority of American citizens now want to return prayer
to public schools" (1).
On June 25, 1962, the Supreme Court delivered its
opinion on Engel u. Vitale, a controversial school prayer
case and the first of its kind (370 U. S. 421; Porter 128).
The majority held that "state officials may not compose an
official state prayer and require that it be recited in the
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public schools of the State at the beginning of each school
day. "
The Case

The State Board of Regents of New York proposed
a non-denominational prayer as patt of the ''Statement on
Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools." In
compliance with this suggestion, the Board of Education
of the Union Free School District, No. 9, New Hyde Park
directed that the prayer be read in the presence of a
school teacher at the beginning of each day. The parents
of ten students brought suit and sought a writ of
mandamus disallowing recitation of the prayer. They
claimed the action encroached upon religious liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of New York
and the Constitution of the United States of America,
applicable by rhe Fourteenth Amendment. The New York
Supreme Court decided that the State Constitution had not
been violated, nor had the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment; however, in order to abide by the Free
Exercise Clause, the court remanded that students would
not be required to participate in the prayer. The district
responded with policy stating that prayer participation
could not be made mandatoty. The decision was upheld
by both the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals of New York. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari upon
which the decision of the lower courts was reversed.
The decision ultimately came to rest on the
meaning of the word "establishment" in the First
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Amendment. Because students were not required to
participate, and the school district's policy expressly
prohibited any coercion on the part of a state employee
(i.e. the teachers), this was not an infringement of free
exercise. The question simply became, does a statecomposed, twenty-two word, non-denomjnational prayer
constitute an establishment of religion?
In arguing for the case of school prayer, the
respondent school district granted with boldness that
recitation of a prayer at the beginning of a school day was
a religious activity. The Board of Regents, as anticus
curiae, in conjunction with the respondents and their
attorneys "all concede[d] the religious nature of prayer, but
[sought] to distinguish this prayer because it [was] based
on our spiritual heritage," (370 U.S. 421, 425). They
defended the prayer by reminding the court it was nondenominational and that no student was compelled to
participate.
Those arguing against the school prayer noted that
the prayer, as composed by a state governmental agency,
represented an establishment of religion by the state.
They applied the test set in 1947 by Euerson v. Board of
Education (330 U.S. 1), a case involving the disclosure of
funds for the busing of school children to parochial
schools. Justice Hugo Black wrote:
The "establishment of religion'' clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another . . . No tax in any
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amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religi01.1S activities. (Lynn 2-3)
Surely the composition of a prayer by a state agency and
the support of it by state funds constituted establishment
of religion.
The Court decided by a 6-1 vote that the
enforcement of school prayer was unconstitutional and
that it certainly represented an establishment of reliaion.
Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black called the
prayer a violation of the Establishment Clause "because [it]
was composed by governmental officials as a part of a
governmental program to further religious beliefs." To
buttress his argument, he recounted condemnable
historical examples of state composed prayer which the
Founders sought to rectify when drafting the First
Amendment in the Bill of Rights.
Justice Black continued his analysis by pointino out
that the "prayer program" in New York, ·'officially
~::>
establishe[d] the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents
prayer. " He answered the contentions of the respondents
by arguing that the non-denominational nature of the
prayer and the lack of coercion on the part of the state to
require participation were irrelevant. The state wrote the
prayer, and by so doing established religion. He added
that while coercion often accompanies governmental
establishment, the underlying purpose of the
Establishment Clause goes much further: "A union of
government and religion tends to destroy governmenr and
to degrade religion" (370 U.S. 421, 431).
In his concurrent opinion, Justice Douglas claimed
that the state aided religion by paying the school teachers
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to conduct the prayer. This represented an establishment
of religion. He asserted that if a state composed prayer
were unconstitutional , the U.S. Supreme Court and both
houses of Congress would be in violation clue to
recognition of deity at the beginning of each of their
sessions. He claimed that a twenty-two word prayer, in
and of itself, did not constitute the establishment of
religion because that is not what the term had meant
historically. He asserted that "once government finances a
religious exercise it inserts a divisive influence into our
communities." He cited Justice Rutledge from an earlier
decision: "public money devoted to p~qment of religious
costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It
brings too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger,
or for any."
Justice StewaLt dissented and. argued that the
recitation of a twenty-two word prayer was hardly an
establishment of religion and prohibiting school children
from its recitation was largely inconsistent with the
activities of the Court, Congress, and the Presidents of the
United States with their references to Deity. He supported
his arguments with historical verbiage from past Presidents
and Founders. He asserted that a recognition of God is
within our heritage and a prayer at the beginning of the
school day is not much unlike singing a patriotic hymn or
anthem. He cited Zorach l'. Clauson: "We are a re ligious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"
(370

u.s. 421, 450).
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Robert Cord and the ACLU

Robert L. Cord, in his book Separation of Church
and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction, excoriated
the recent philosophy of classroom prayer exclusion. He
referred to James Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments" and ind icated that the
Court, which cited it in the decision, misapplied its intent.
Madison wrote the essay to call for an end to the payment
of state funds to religious teachers. Corel argued that the
essay, composed a few years before the Constitution, did
not stand in contradiction to religious establishment, only
the preference of one religion over <.lnother. Besides,
supposed Cord, if Madison were against the establishment
of prayer as a part of public activity, why would he so
ardently support, even personally advocate, the institution
of a Chaplain and prayer as a part of Congressional
activities just a few years later? No, the primary author of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not intend that
prayer be excluded from public activity. Corel additiona lly
argued that while authority to establish religion is denied
Congress, it ought to be granted to the states. Only recent
coutt decisions incorpornting the First Amendment
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states have altered this condition.
The American Civil Liberties Union offered a
contrast to Cord's perspective. A self-proclaimed
institution for the protection of basic law-guaranteed
rights, the ACLU promoted separationist theory by
defining establishment as ''the endorsement of either a

single religion or religion generally. Government should
be neutral in matters of religion, preferring neither one
religion over another nor religion over irreligion'' (Lynn 2).
They wrote that school prayer as administered by the state
or its agent is strictly forbidden. Likewise, no student may
be compelled to pray or participate in any religious
activity. Recognizing that students' religious beliefs cannot
be denied in any way, they added that a moment of
silence may be allowed at the beginning of each school
clay; however, the school may not encourage students to
pray during this time, neither encou r<.lge them to assume a
position of prayer (13).
Religion, Precedent, and Establishment

With the New York School Prayer case, we have a
clear establishment of religion. Primarily, this conclusion
resides in the meaning of the word "establislunent," but
may also be directed to the term "religion" and requires
understanding of the precedent cases involved.
Long before Engel, a number of cases offered some
indication as to how this question was to be answered. In
1948, the Court decided McCollum v. Board ofEducation
(333 U.S. 203), in which school children were allowed to
be released from school for thirty to forty-five minutes
during the day to receive religious instruction in a campus
classroom. The Court held that it was unconstitutional to
allow the instruction as it represented support by the state
to hold the instruction in public buildings. A few years
later, the Court decided Zoracb u. Clauson. Similarly,
school children were released from the regular school
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activities to receive religious instruction during the school
day. Yet~ in this case the location of the instruction was
held off-campus, and therefore did not constitute state aid.
The basis for Zorach and McCollum lies in Euerson.
Since McCollum involved the allocation of state funds for
religious education, it was declared unconstitutional, while
Zorach was not declared unconstitutional on those same
grounds. In a related case in 1952, Doremus v. Board of
Education (342 U.S. 429), the court dismissed a suit by a
New Jersey taxpayer claiming the state violated the First
Amendment by requiring the reading of five Old
Testament verses at the beginning of the school day. The
grounds for the dismissal were that the reaclino
b
represented no cost in public money (Sutherland 32).
\Vhen Engel came to coutt, the consideration of these
precedents was likely in the minds of the justices.
The meaning of the word ·'religion," though not
expl icitly referred to by the justices in their decisions, is a
pertinent issue. In his opinion, Justice Black distinguished
" the
between• the vvord "church," and the word ·'relioion
b
,
latter of which vvould appear to signify ·'many re ligious
denominations '' (Porter 125). He called the New York
prayer a "religious activity" and consequently applied it to
the First Amendment. The broadened term included
anything that might be construed as religious in namre,
and allowed the application of the First Amendment to the
school prayer issue. The term "religious activity" first
appeared in Euerson's definition of establishment.
Hence, the court came to rest on the issue of
''establishment." Both Justice Black and Justice Douglas
made viable attempts at indicating the violation. Justice
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Douglas seemed to follow a more precedent-based
decision by charging the state with using tax dollars for
the conducting of religious activity in the schools. This
was wholly consistent with the motivations for the
decisions in McCollum, Zorach, and Doremus. In fact, the
problem with Justice Stewatt's dissent in this case was that
he implicitly, yet completely, denies this precedent.
Justice Black delivered the crushing blow when he
pointed out that because the state composed the prayer, it
represents an establishment of religion. This opinion
fairly represented what is at stake. The state has no right
to declare religious belief. By so doing, they risk
infringement upon the religious liberty of a swdent or
students who do not ascribe to particular doctrines
maintained in the prayer. And in effect, is not a nondenominational prayer just that-a prayer to which no
denomination regularly ascribes?
The decision in Engel was right, but the Court and
the state should adopt more of an "accommodation"
theory in future application of First Amendment rights. As
Gerald A. Eppner puts it, "governmental cooperation with
religious authorities is a national tradition and . . . there is
no constitutional requirement of 'callous indifference' to
religion'· (500). Total separation may yield certain
benefits, but it also breeds at least a mild hostility between
religion and the state (Shiffman 94). Students ought not to
feel restricted when they do practice their religious beliefs
appropriately at school.
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Implications

In Engel the justices boldly declared that statecomposed prayers cannot be allowed in public schools,
no matter the circumstance. This ran against the accepted
norm since prayer had been a part of school until not long
before the decision. Characteri zed by a fair amount of
judicial activism, decisions of this nature generally find
themselves in prominent positions and encourage futu re
activism. As a result of this decision, First Amendment
rights became more nanowly defined to include school
prayer as an establishment of religion, and states were
disallowed from performing activities that could compel
someone to unwillingly participate in a religious activity.
Engel is affecting cases being heard on the court
today. One such case is that of Rachel Bauchmann, a
former student of West High School in Salt Lake City, Utah
(Kossow 2- 3). As a sophomore in the high school choir,
she was required ro sing about something in which she
did not believe. Undoubtedly there have been many
before her who have done the same thing, but Rachel
spoke out, and currently the case is being heard in the
lower courts. Could precedent like Engel eventually lead
to exclusion of religious music in our high schools? That
is yet to be decided, but with the Colllt presently leaning
toward "accommodation" philosophy, it is not certain.
What is clear is that Engel has lead to a more
complete separation of religion from the public school
system, to the degree that today most teachers fear even
the slightest reference to religious belief or deity in their

lessons. Unfortunately, the students suffer because
religion is inseparable from a proper education. Indeed, it
is part of the heritage of this country. \What Engel really
means is not that religion is separate from public schools,
but that the state may not author that religion or impose
any other religion on students.
Conclusion
It may be difficult to determine all the effects of
Engel. Certainly, it has left the supporters of school prayer

with an increased resolution to reverse the Court's
determination. Ultimately, though , the decision was wellfounded . While prayer in public schools ought to be
allowable on certain grounds, for a state agency to
compose and require a prayer is wholly unconstitutional.
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Released Time Education
Julie Edwards
Introduction
The First Amendment, made applicable to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits state and
national laws "respecting an establishment of religion... Its
purpose is to promote religious freedom for all without
governmental interference or favoritism. Pursuant to
statutOty authorization, the New York City Board of
Education established a program that allows parents to
request that their children be released from public school
instruction for religious instruction or devotionals for a
limited time each clay. Students are allowed to leave the
school buildings and grounds to go to religious centers for
religious instruction or devotional exercises. The same
provision makes school attendance compulsory. The
students not released stay in the classrooms, and the
churches report to the schools the names of children
released from public school who fail to report for religious
instruction. The regulation further specifies that such
programs involve neither religious instruction in public
school buildings nor the expenditure of public funds
(Zomch z•. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-9).
The law was challenged by taxpayers and residents
of New York City and whose children attend its public

